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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, MOSCOW, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW, US MISSION NATO, USUN, ZAGREB, US MISSION GENEVA

FROM : Amembassy BELGRADE

DATE:

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFA
March 27, 1969
RECEIVED

SUBJECT : Yugoslav Strategist on ABM Decision

REF :

APR 1 1969

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A clear and evenly-balanced statement of Yugoslav views on the US decision to proceed with deployment of the Sentinel ABM system in a "thin" configuration was provided March 20 in Komunist, the weekly journal of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), under the by-line of Major General Berislav BADURINA, Yugoslavia's senior strategic theorist. On the basis of his analysis of the reasons underlying the decision General Badurina concludes that military and strategic conclusions were not of predominant importance, but that military-strategic aspects of the decision may have the most serious consequences for world peace and security, since influential forces on the other side also believe in negotiating from positions of strength.

In Badurina's analysis the decision was based primarily on considerations of domestic politics and economics, although he also points out that it strengthens the American military and psychological position in preparation for a summit meeting with the Soviet leaders. Domestic considerations allegedly involved include: President NIXON's desire to strengthen his reputation with the American people by emphasizing his concern for national security; the usefulness of the technological "fall-out" from research and development of the system in keeping US industry ahead of any competitors; the influence of the "military-industrial complex", which may eventually bring about deployment of a "thick" system; and the usefulness of the expenditures on the system in offsetting possible reductions in military procurement as a result of a reduction of US military involvement in Viet-Nam or elsewhere, thus permitting maintenance of US technological and industrial capabilities at the highest level and assisting American companies in preserving their privileged position in both the

Decontrol following March 24, 1970

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
DAO: MBorodkin

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AREA DEFENSE WEAPON EFFECTS


HIGH ALTITUDE
SPARTAN
INTERCEPT



NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS
ON PEOPLE OR PROPERTY

ATMOSPHERE

TARGET



SPARTAN
BATTERY



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Belgrade A- 145

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agreement between the great powers Yugoslavia might find itself only a pawn to be surrendered in the interests of avoiding nuclear war. All in all, Badurina's treatment of the President's decision on the ABM substantially is the same as might be found in the press of Western Europe or of the US itself, for that matter.

ELBRICK




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TYPICAL SPARTAN COVERAGE CONTOUR

ICBM DIRECTION



SITE LOCATION R12

ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY



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
DECISION-MAKING REQUIRED BY ABM SYSTEM? WHAT ARE PROSPECTS OF THIS ASPECT, IMMENSE EXPENDITURES INVOLVED BRINGING US, SOVIETS TO CONFERENCE TABLE?

3. IN ORDER TO DO TV SERIES/BOOK PORTISCH WILL HAVE TO SEE TOP EXPERTS IN FIELDS MENTIONED ABOVE, BE GIVEN THOROUGH TOUR OF UNCLASSIFIED INSTALLATIONS, BE PERMITTED TO FILM WHEREEVER POSSIBLE.

4. TIME IS OF ESSENCE. PORTISCH'S TIGHT SCHEDULE PERMITS HIM ONLY THREE WEEKS IN US STARTING LATE APRIL. URGE THIS REQUEST BE GIVEN FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION AND THAT A DETAILED PROGRAM BE WORKED OUT FOR HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MACARTHUR

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MISSILE SITE RADAR



PROTOTYPE UNIT AT
KWAJALEIN TEST AREA

CHARACTERISTICS:

DETECTION RANGE
SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES

BUILDING SIZE
120 FT. x 120 FT. x 40 FT. ABOVE GROUND

ANTENNA: DIAMETER
13.5 FT.

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should the super-powers enter into an ABM race that would aim at achieving invulnerability. The siphoning off of substantial US defense resources into a new weapons system to the extent that US troop commitments might be affected would also trouble the Germans. It is important that the US consult closely with the Germans through NATO and bilateral channels as our program and policies evolve.

End of Summary

1. A sifting of German opinion among personalities in the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defense, Parliament, the press, and the public at large reveals relatively little debate or controversy at this time arising from President Nixon's March 14 announcement of his decision to deploy a limited anti-ballistic missile defense, or from the subsequent Administration statements before the Congress. The German reaction has been conditioned by a number of factors:


a. Former Secretary McNamara's initial announcement of September 1967 provided the somber realization that this new phase of futuristic warfare confronted the world. The most recent decision was in consequence reduced in the public and official mind to a reminder that the ugly problem was still with us.

b. The major question provoked in 1967 was whether Europe too would ultimately require a defensive missile system. However, the highly useful NPG conclusions in Ankara helped to clarify this aspect for German defense planners, and it is no longer a live issue.

c. Among those familiar with the intricacies of the problem there is general satisfaction that the US has chosen to protect its retaliatory capability, and also that the US did not decide to abandon ABM development. There is also some relief that the US has not embarked on an ABM program of such scope as to strain US defense resources to the point where cut-backs in the US conventional forces in Europe might be required.

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SUCCESSFUL FLIGHT TESTS

LENGTH	27 FEET
DIAMETER	4.5 FEET
RANGE	APPROX. 25 MILES

SPRINT

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
4.

5. Discussions with German political leaders generally revealed little alarm over the revised US ABM decision. Neither was much interest or knowledge displayed. By far the most interesting reaction came from a defense adviser to the SPD, recently appointed to a disarmament and policy planning role in the Foreign Office. He confirmed that public concern was minimal but said that in more informed circles there existed a degree of confusion and uncertainty. This group, which obviously included him, realized the need for a review of the ABM problem by the new US Administration but did not fully understand the objectives, intentions and strategy involved in the President's decision, especially as it related to SALT. Some of the more obvious factors visible to the Germans arose from US domestic considerations as reflected in the congressional debate, the desire for budgetary savings, the necessity of protecting the Minute Man sites, and the rationale for the deemphasizing protection of the cities. But all the nuances involved in determination of the US nuclear and counter-nuclear strategy were not known to the German experts. Also undeterminable would be the effect on longer range relations between the US and the USSR.

6. Many knowledgeable Germans welcomed the President's recent decision as evidence of a US determination to remain strong. However, Secretary of Defense Laird had testified that the US decision could still be reversed. Under what conditions would such a reversal take place; if the Soviets were willing to abandon their ABM? Should SALT be postponed for one reason or another and the US ABM went into the deployment phase, would this mark the start of a new arms race? Nothing had been said about the relationship between MIRV and the ABM. What were the dangers of upsetting the present nuclear equilibrium? Among German political leaders there lingered some feel that negotiations between the superpowers could be to the disadvantage of Europe. President Nixon had made it quite clear that he hoped to undertake talks with the USSR on the Near East, the Far East including Vietnam, and perhaps Berlin. How would discussions on these political questions be related to and affected by the progressive emplacement of an ABM system in the US. Students of strategy in Germany

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MODIFIED SENTINEL



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6.

9. Press reaction to the announcement of President Nixon's decision and the ensuing Senate discussion on the ABM defense system has been varied but low key. There was almost unanimous agreement that Nixon met his primary responsibility in thinking first of American security requirements. Whether one agreed with his decision or not, "the grounds he set forth were clear, plain and certainly sincere." (Stuttgarter Zeitung). Die Welt stated "no President could have reached a more calibrated decision". Most papers believed that he prevented an even deeper split in America over the cost of the system which Johnson was considering. Some editorials noted, however, that domestic controversy still exists and Congressional approval is by no means assured. On the international implications of the decision there was less agreement. Handelsblatt said that "President Nixon chose a wise compromise The USA retains a nuclear power large enough to overpower a Soviet ABM system if necessary. Moreover, Nixon will examine his ABM program every year. The door for disarmament negotiations remains open." The Stuttgarter Zeitung was more critical. "In international diplomatic quarters Nixon's decision will increase skepticism regarding the real intentions of the nuclear powers." It added "ABM's in the Soviet Union and in the US again pose the question to the non-nuclear states of how they can provide for their security if the nuclear powers further increase and improve their arsenals." The Suddeutsche Zeitung felt he created a better negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Last week's Der Spiegel was skeptical: "...Until now Nixon had skilfully created the impression that by a new professional conduct of business and solid political workmanship he would more than compensate for his renunciation of far-reaching programs and visionary solutions... (Congressional opposition to the ABM decision) has made it obvious that workmanship and routine do not sufficiently qualify a man to conduct world business. America's problems in Vietnam, Europe and the U.S. cannot be solved by mere thinking on a political seminar pattern. For the first time President Nixon has run into what galled President Johnson -- foreign criticism: Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau described Nixon's ABM decision as a declaration of bankruptcy and a failure of the ideas of humaneness." Press comment in the past week has been almost absent.

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THREAT

PREVIOUS: (1967)

1. CHINESE ICBM TEST SEEMED IMMINENT
2. SOVIET ICBM EFFORT EXPECTED TO LEVEL OFF
3. ADEQUATE WARNING PREDICTED FOR U.S. BOMBERS

PROSPECT:

1. CHINESE ICBM DELAYED BUT STILL EXPECTED
 - a. THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD TESTED
 - b. MISSILE TEST FACILITIES EXPANDED
2. SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT & DEVELOPMENT CONTINUING
3. SOVIET POLARIS-TYPE SUBMARINE IN PRODUCTION,
REDUCING U.S. Bomber WARNING TIME
4. PROBABLE SOVIET DECISION ON FRACTIONAL ORBIT
BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM (FOBS)

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8.

e. Consultation. Following the President's pledges to NATO and our Allies individually German officials will expect candid, timely and detailed consultation on US ABM plans. The US strategic deterrent is also fundamental to their security, and its protection becomes a matter of great importance to them. Any reluctance on our part to share information or to provide an opportunity for German questioning will generate concern. The NPG is admirably suited for official exchanges on an Alliance basis, particularly on the more sensitive aspects. However, it may be necessary to supplement this by special briefings for larger Foreign Office and Ministry of Defense audiences. In addition, the Embassy should be provided more detailed technical and conceptual information which can be used with German parliamentarians.

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FESSENDEN

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MEASURED DEPLOYMENT-MODIFIED SENTINEL

INCLUDED IN FY 69 BUDGET
REVISION 8
FY TO BUDGET REQUEST

- START CONSTRUCTION AND PROCUREMENT TO INSTALL SITES IN TWO MINUTEMAN WINGS
- SURVEY, SELECT, POSSIBLY ACQUIRE OTHER SITES
- CONTINUE ALL NECESSARY ROUTEE

THESE MEASURES ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL, AND DEPENDENT ON THE THREAT

FOR A DEVELOPING USSR THREAT

- ADD PROTECTION OF MINUTEMAN
- OR, ADD SITES TO GIVE MORE TIME FOR LAUNCH OF ALERT BOMBERS
- OR BOTH

FOR A DEVELOPING CHINESE THREAT

- ADD SITES TO PROTECT POPULATION


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Soviet commentators evidently welcomed the opportunity to cast Secretary of Defense Laird rather than the President as the principal villain.

In their efforts to exploit the US ABM decision, Soviet propagandists have exposed Soviet citizens to American anti-ABM arguments of a kind which last year circulated illicitly in the underground Sakharov memorandum. While this development is not likely to have any early effects on Soviet policy on strategic arms talks, it may have unintended consequences over the longer run. If such publicity for anti-armaments arguments from the US continues, the Soviet leaders may find they have to make more of an effort to justify their own arms spending later on.

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FLIGHT TESTS IN PROGRESS
ADDITIONAL WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT NECESSARY

LENGTH 55 FEET
RANGE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES



SPARTAN

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-- The Soviets have picked up arguments about expense (they quote figures from American newspapers including extravagant projections of systems costing hundreds of billions of dollars) for systems which may be ineffective while social needs remain unmet.

-- The Soviets have picked up arguments that ABMs may give new impetus to the arms race and interfere with disarmament. However--and this is an important distinction--they have kept this to a discussion of American arguments about US policy and have said nothing to indicate any change in the Soviet position on strategic arms talks.

-- The Soviets have registered concern over possible effects of ABMs both in terms of protests from residents of cities near which Sentinel deployment had been planned and in terms of Canadian concern over detonations over Canadian territory.

-- A couple of items noted American speculations that the ABM program might stimulate arms procurement in Europe, and particularly by West Germany.

Strategic Issues Treated Very Lightly

Although the Soviet commentators have reported most of the arguments in the US debate, they have treated strategic issues very lightly. In general, these tend to be the arguments on which Soviet journalists have least experience and background and on which they would expect Soviet authorities to be most sensitive. And some reticence on the part of Soviet publicists was to be expected.

Thus, the commentators took note of the difference between Sentinel deployment to protect cities and Safeguard to protect ICBMs, but they generally ignored the strategic implications of the change (which is intended to leave Soviet deterrent forces unaffected while protecting America's).

While Soviet commentators decried Secretary Laird's imputing aggressive designs to the USSR, Leontyev in Red Star was the only one we noted who specifically mentioned his reference to the idea of a "first strike" capability. And Leontyev did not explain to his readers what that term meant in overall force posture.



Soviet ABMs Not Mentioned

Nothing was said about Soviet ABMs in the Soviet discussion of the American debate over Sentinel and Safeguard. Indeed,

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PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR



DEVELOPMENT STATUS
COMPONENTS TESTED FIRST RADAR
TO BE ASSEMBLED AND TESTED
ON OPERATIONAL SITE

CHARACTERISTICS:

DETECTION RANGE

GREATER THAN 1000 MILES

BUILDING SIZE

211 FT. x 209 FT. x 130 FT. HIGH

ANTENNA: DIAMETER

112 FT.